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1 Introduction1
The publication of the World Banks 1997 World
Development Report is a welcome event. As with
preceding reports in this series, it is supported by
an impressive amount of preparatory work and
data, endowing it with a formidable aura of credi-
bility This does not simplify the task of commeri-
tary and critique. As most observers have noted,
the Report signals a certain change in the so-called
'Washington consensus' regarding 'good policies',
which has dominated the thinking and action of
the World Bank as its profile in the developing
world has increased over the past 15 years or so.
After the 1981 Berg Report and the Long Term
Perspective Study (World Bank 1981 and 1989) -
which, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, stigma-
tised the state as the principal culprit for the fail-
ures of development - one cannot but be
impressed by the conceptual flexibility displayed
by the Bank and by its expressed goal of carrying
out its work more effectively which it has always
recommended to developing states. Though
emphasising the patent failures of the overly statist
policies adopted in the newly independent devel-
oping countries, the Bank implicitly recognises the
excesses of its own past anti-state assumptions.
The Report recommends a two-part strategy First
of all, the state must concentrate its efforts on its
traditional areas of competence and on feasible
endeavours, while taking into account its resources
and capabilities. When resources are limited,
overly ambitious objectives can be counterproduc-
tive. Secondly, public institutions must be strength-
ened, precisely in order to increase the capabilities
and efficiency of the state. This assessment is
shared by that other Bretton Woods institution, the
International Monetary Fund, as Tanzí (1997),
among others, shows in his account of how con-
ceptions of the state have varied in the course of
history WDR97 examines the basic functions of
the state and the space it must cede to the market
(first strategy), and the differing measures involved
in the reinvigorating of institutions (second strat-
egy). The latter includes the elaboration of effective
rules, fighting corruption, greater competitive pres-
sure, improved incentives for public agents, and
Translated by Arun Kapil. The author wishes to thank
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increased participation on the part of the citizenry.
The Report discusses the insertion of states in a
globalised world, the emergence of international
organisations and public goods, and the problems
of international collective action, as well as factors
behind the resistance to reforms. One positive inno-
vation of the Report is the use it makes of recent
analyses from the new political economy, the new
institutional economics, and the political economy
of reform. Previous analyses tended not to stray far
from purely economic paradigms.
This article will discuss the principal themes of the
Report but also point out some of its shortcomings.
Such a critique, it is hoped, will aid the Bank in its
future research on this vast subject, which could
make an important contribution to its effectiveness.
The article will proceed along two lines.
The first line of argument centres on the concep-
tions of the state, public administration, and struc-
ture of incentives contained in the Report. What the
Report does not adequately integrate into its analy-
sis is history politics, and the unique 'path depen-
dence' of states. The Report is constrained by the
identity of its author and publisher - an interna-
tional financial institution - and by an economistic
approach based on a small number of universal and
stylized facts. The character, positive or normative,
of the undertaking remains ambiguous. Operating
from a neoclassical perspective, the analysis does
not take into account sufficiently the structures,
mechanisms, micro-economic calculations and
expectations forged over the long run in developing
states, political rationalities, or, in consequence, the
feasibility of reforms induced by external financial
institutions such as the Bank. The notions of insti-
tution, governance, and corruption thus remain
problematic. lt is important, however, to under-
stand these micro-economic factors, as they consti-
tute an internal impediment to reform and underlie
the uncertainty affecting new structures emerging
from the ruins of previous rentier-type arrange-
ments (the good as well as the bad: mafias, middle-
men, lack of transparency in privatisations,
decentralisation of corruption and its consequent
aggravation, and so on).
The second line of argumentation concerns the
credibility of international governance: the credi-
bility of the Report's arguments in view of those on
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the minimal state promoted by the Bank not so long
ago and whose consequences for the recipients were
often far from positive, and the credibility of the
Bank as an aid agency given the constraints
imposed by its mandate. The principal justification
of multilateral institutions, and particularly those
created at Bretton Woods, includes the furnishing of
collective goods, providing information and credi-
bility in international markets for states that lack
them, and including these states in multilateral
binding agreements (Rodrik 1996). This is the basis
of conditionality The extension of these instru-
ments to domains that are increasingly structural
and the process of globalisation cannot but pose
problems for the credibility of these multilateral
institutions (Dhonte 1997 for the IMP). One of the
purposes of these international institutions is to act
as agents of modernisation, to undermine both
domestic rent-seeking and rentier activity issuing
from the foreign policy interests of bilateral donors
engaged in the pursuit of agendas different from
those of the reform-minded multilaterals, These are
external limits, concerning international agencies
and efforts to improve developing states.
2 Developing States and Their
Institutions
WDR97 abandons past prejudices about the exces-
sive weight of the state and correctly emphasises the
link between the growth of the state and level of
development, which is clearly borne out in com-
paring the level of taxation in industrialised and
developing countries. The excesses of the state are
no longer regarded as the causal factor of underde-
velopment. What is important is its quality its 'style'
(the 'developmental state', a familiar concept in the
research of the IDS). A continuation of the animated
debate over the East Asian Miracle (World Bank
1993) is observed here. Several observations will be
offered on the nature of states and institutions that
are characteristic of developing countries, particu-
larly in Africa, and to which the Report could have
accorded greater importance.
Credibility of states and consequences of
personal rule
In a number of developing countries - and not only
in the vicious circles of 'collapsed states', which are
well covered in the Report - one major problem is
that agents accord little credibility to the beneficial
effects of the state. The manner in which they view
the state, which is path dependent, differs from that
prevailing in developed countries. One reason has
to do with the personal nature of rule, which is not
necessarily coupled with particular political regimes
(democracies, military juntas) and is focused fore-
most on the short-run management of problems
related to legitimacy and staying in power. A second
reason is that the perception individuals have of the
state is shaped by the behaviour of the bureaucrats
who are supposed to represent public authority But
these bureaucrats themselves often have rio concep-
tion of, or belief in, the general interest and use
their positions within the state apparatus mainly as
a source of personal enrichment (tax collectors, cus-
toms agents, etc.). The consequences for attempts
to reform the state are structural and general.
The consequences of personal rule in weakly insti-
tutionalised states - which may nonetheless contain
formally democratic institutions - and of the
absence of autonomous institutions is that political
leaders pursue particular micro-rationalities of lead-
ers,2 which are based above all on trying to stay in
power. These rationalities lead to dependence of
leaders on particular channels of information,
whose content may be highly partial, and to depen-
dence on the support of certain groups and organ-
isms, most notably the security services, which
results in decisions and in an overall conception of
the state that is quite different from that of develop-
ment agencies. The lack of information possessed
by these rulers - preoccupied as they are by the
immediate exigencies of staying in power - as to the
changing nature of the world economy explains in
part their attachment to the status quo and resis-
tance to reforms. Behaviour based on purely local
political considerations also leads to the systematic
subversion of existing institutions - the interrup-
tion of electoral processes, the neutralisation of the
opposition - if they constitute a threat to the lead-
ers staying in power. The calculations of the execu-
tive are essentially based on short-term
considerations about the risks of political liberalisa-
tion. Finally, to stay in power in the absence of insti-
tutions requires personal enrichment, in order,
among other things, to purchase support. Civil ser-
vice recruitment is often based on considerations
(ethnicity, regionalism, etc.) that have little ro do
2 And not the state, as public choice theorists maintain.
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with good governance as conceived by international
aid experts. The utilisation of public enterprises, of
resources generated by trade policies, and choices
regarding public investment also follow this logic.
The paucity of resources consecrated to the func-
tioning of state agencies, coupled with the vague-
ness of administrative tasks, leads to increasing
bureaucratisation. The same calculations may be
exhibited by public and private agents and at each
institutional level (regulatory institutions, oversight
of customs agencies, judiciaries, political parties,
NGO's, etc.). There is no reason to assume that
agents with oversight responsibilities do not partic-
ipate in this system. This is indeed a cause of the
failure of so many formal oversight mechanisms
(inspection of customs procedures, computerisa-
tion). The discontinuity of decisions and lack of
effective authority over state functionaries are thus
major problems affecting states of this type and
which hinder the implementation of reforms.
Constrained by an economic approach and by the
official status of the World Bank, WDR97 displays a
great difficulty in dealing with the purely political
dimension of the state. The same is true of the
Report's treatment of the genesis and ingredients of
the developmental state. The Report lists a series of
necessary institiflional characteristics. These are,
however, dealt with in a static manner, with little
insight into dynamic trajectories, the development
of content, and the orientation of institutions.
Research has demonstrated that there is no single
and necessary trait favourable to development: for
example, authoritarian or democratic states, types
of civil rights, modes of representation. It all
depends on the content that is assigned to formal
institutions: a dictator may be benevolent just as
political pluralism may be the source of manipula-
tion and instability, and longevity in power the
source of credibility and predictability for private
investment or, inversely, of slow economic decline.
Cohesion may be brought about by an enlightened
leadership with a vision motivated by nationalism
or religion. WDR97 does not solve the difficulty of
understanding the exact process that renders an
institution efficient or not, which greatly varies
according to the contexts, values, and collective
objectives that determine the manner in which
institutions are used. The Report at the end
implicitly recognises this in distinguishing regional
agendas, trajectories, and problems of different
states according to region (sub-Saharan Africa, East
Asia, South Asia, etc.). These agendas are, however,
dealt with schematically and the distinctions are not
really introduced by the analyses that precede them.
The concepts that are utilised do not allow for a bet-
ter comprehension of the impetus behind long-term
change, which requires changes in values and the
endogenous ownership of formal rules (e.g., relat-
ing to altruism, the public interest, mechanisms of
coordination).
The Report is aware that as soon as the issue of the
state is broached, politics, opposition, and local
resistance come into play This represents progress
in the conceptual apparatus of the World Bank.
Despite the welcome integration of political econ-
omy into the Report, however, politics remains
'under-theorised.' The identification of existing
power relationships, of winners and losers in the
reform process and their respective strength, is lim-
ited to, for example, cursory remarks on pro- and
anti-reform interest groups, and with the notion
that appropriate incentives may influence their
behaviour. But these interest groups are not always
clearly distinguishable in developing countries, pre-
cisely due to lower levels of institutionalisation
(Haggard and Webb 1993). Furthermore, these
'groups' do not always act on the basis of their
'interests', of which they do not have the same
vision as the reformers, even if it is objectively
advantageous to them, as electoral failures of tech-
nocratic governments in Africa have shown.
Likewise, preference for the status quo may seem
preferable to the uncertainty of reform (Fernandez
and Rodrik 1991). The presence of lobbies is also a
characteristic of developing countries. The question
as to the content of these interests and the ingredi-
ents for good government - both historical and
contextual - is not explored in the Report. The
Report deals with the state in a globalised world but
paradoxically has little to say about the global
implications of the weakness of states, such as the
issue of international corruption, the contagious
effect of bad domestic policies, the maintenance of
'collapsed states' by markets or through interna-
tional development aid Uackson and Rosberg 1982;
Reno 1995 on Sierra Leone), or on the upheaval
that globalisation implies for the status of states
(e.g. Evans 1997). This leads to reflection on the
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actual limits of multilateral mandates and their cur-
rent instruments (or that of other agencies) in pro-
moting internal 'institutional reinvigoration'.
In effect, the Report continues to define the state
principally by the presence and capabilities of a
series of institutions. But the state, as a political
entity, cannot be reduced to the juxtaposition of
institutions. In addition, these are relatively nar-
rowly defined and centred on the supply of public
goods: these institutions are essentially conceived as
functional and technical (as with the 'tautological
functionalism' of the new institutional economics,
according to the expression of Toye 1995; Stein
1995). Consequently, one poses questions as to
their content and evolution all through the Report,
which does not make full use of the institutional
theories and their research on the plurality of types
of transactions, contracts, and exchange of property
rights. The Report, in fact, gives the impression of
being a theoretical compromise dominated by the
macro-economic perspective of rational expecta-
tions, with the importance that this attaches to the
notion of credibility The Report only makes passing
use of micro-economic theory that justifies state
intervention on the grounds of market failure, of
the imperfect and costly nature of information, and
the uncertainty of agents. These concepts both val-
idate intervention to reduce uncertainty and explain
the failures of inopportune intervention (Stiglitz
1989). The state is not better informed than the
market but, one may add, neither are aid agencies.
This perspective, which accords importance to the
micro-rationalities of private agents, is oddly
absent, including when the Report analyses regula-
tory and industrial policy In particular, private
firms are dealt with rapidly, whereas their organisa-
tion (contracts) constitutes a response to market
failures, which is complementary to the state. In
slight contradiction with the critique at the begin-
ning of the Report, regarding the excessive role that
was previously assigned to the technocracy, this
implicitly remains within the framework of a state-
private sector discontinuity Placed in the forefront
are the capabilities of public institutions animated
by 'technically capable' individuals chosen
according to merit.
The most well-conceived modernising reforms may
neglect market failures and missing markets, both
of which characterise developing countries. Success
may therefore be mixed for liberalising reforms, pri-
vatisations, and policies aimed at shifting functions
from the state to the private sector. The reciprocal
ties between the state and private sector and the
short term expectations of the latter, which are
under-analysed in the Report, determine, however,
the capabilities of the state and the behaviour of
administrations. The expectations of the private
sector are linked to its characteristics and its organ-
isation: for example, it is often small in size and the
object of suspicion by governments (sub-Saharan
Africa), driven by short-term financial considera-
tions (Mexico, Thailand), or enmeshed in non-
transparent relationships with politicians, which is
precisely a characteristic of weakly institutionalised
states. Even if it were to mean employing the
notions of expectations and credibility, the Report
could have taken them more seriously at the micro-
economic level (that of agents and organisations).
The reforms come up against the contradictory
expectations of several actors: those of leaders, local
private agents, external investors, and aid agencies.
The credibility of the actions of each depends upon
their past relationships and established reputations.
The credibility of African states is thus negative.3
Local expectations may neutralise reforms (e.g. with
informalisation, windfall profits resulting from
speculative activity, corrupting routines), just as
may the poor timing of political and economic
reforms (problem of time inconsistency, i.e., policy
reversal after they have succeeded). This is the case
for certain economies in transition in the former
Soviet Union. In sub-Saharan Africa in particular,
over the decades receiving aid and its repeated
games, the geopolitical dimension of sanctions or
the pursuit of loans creates rational expectations on
the part of governments to postpone reforms.
The reinvigoration of institutions
The Report rightly shows that the weakness of pub-
lic institutions is one of the central problems of
developing states: absence of clearly defined rules,
of agencies of restraint (such as conceptualised by
Collier 1991), of a deficit of incentives, of account-
ability, and of transparency Along with other inter-
national agencies (OECD, IMF), corruption is
The weakness of investment in sub-Saharan Africa
after 15 years of reforms can be explained not only by
economic fundamentals but also by a particularly
negative reputation with investors (Bhattacharya et al.
1996, Collier and Gunning 1997).
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finally being taken seriously This merits comment.
Rules and agencies of restraint. For an effective
regulatory framework, restrictive rules are essential
- and they should come with accountability and
transparency Though necessary, they are nonethe-
less not sufficient. Their formal existence, which is
already appreciable, does not tell us about their
quality or 'loyalty'. They must be 'owned', be the
objects of adhesion. Problems subsist when the
'meta-rules', which enjoin respect of the rules, are
not evident within the oversight agencies: such as
central banks (for which autonomy is not sufficient,
as WDR97 recognises), prudential rules, budgetary
procedures, and surveillance of state-owned finan-
cial monopolies, and above all, fiscal and customs
activities. As financial scandals in developed coun-
tries remind us, autonomy and esprit de corps,
which are presented in the Report as elements of
efficient administration, can even result in a lack of
transparency and accountability An obvious rea-
son is that those at the highest levels set the exam-
ple to follow and their behaviour is naturally
mimicked by state agents down the hierarchy
Another element concerns the mechanisms for
enforcing contracts: weak states do not possess
adequate instruments for dealing with opportunis-
tic behaviour, or with important asymmetries in
information that is characteristic of them. Retaining
information can even represent a bonus for poorly
remunerated bureaucrats. As the Report clearly
recognises, decentralisation and the separation of
powers, laudable as they may be, can in fact further
contribute to the weakness of states, of corruption,
and hamper oversight in contexts characterised by
serious deficits in information (top-down and bot-
tom-up) and in the ability to implement decisions.
The enactment of new rules does not a priori con-
stitute a better guarantee, with their efficiency
depending upon initial conditions. The World
Bank's recommendations here hits arm obstacle,
which is the political character of governments. As
the Report admits, we do not know what it takes to
produce the 'farsighted political leaders' that it
recommends - leaders who are reform-minded and
give their citizens a 'sense of owning the reforms',
A case in point is Credit Lyonnais's current $20 billion
financial abyss, for which high level civil servants
belonging to the same 'corps' bear responsibility
while at the same time controlling and consolidat-
ing their states.5 This leadership, however, appears
to be the key; such understanding of it as we have
comes from disciplines other than economics and
political economy
Competition and meritocracy. The necessity of
competition is an excellent principle and is given a
prime place in the Report. It is not only an issue for
state-owned financial monopolies: the judiciary
must also be a priority here. As Joseph Stiglitz
(1997), among others has shown, appropriate
incentives are essential for good government. For
certain countries, however, the road is long and tor-
tuous. Regimes based on personal rule, even when
formally democratic, tend to adopt clientelistic
practices in recruitment and the allocation of state
contracts. The private sector, which is a source of
competition, is diminished in importance, as is that
of human capital. Vicious circles ensuing from
macro-economic constraints (controlled wages,
weak tax base) and distortions of educational sys-
tems lead to problems of policy coherence (priority
given to primary education, but also to the flight of
elites abroad or to the private sector). Drawing
credibility from its status as an outsider and as a
technical and apolitical public good, the Bank is not
well equipped to introduce instruments that would
modify these constraints and local political rational-
ities. The reinvigoration of technocrats is a good
idea, but the latter are often neutralised in weak
states as soon as they venture into politically sensi-
tive areas. Conversely - and in a paradox well
known by technocrats - they are obliged to become
politicised in order to be effective, thus losing their
credibility (Williamson 1994). The reinvigoration
of technicians in the civil service is necessary as
they are often caught between the arbitrary behav-
iour of their political superiors and the 'community
pressure' of their families and social networks,
which are of vital importance in states lacking a
social safety net. These were important factors in
the development of states in East Asia, which the
Bank fully recognises. However, the instruments
utilised up to now - technical cooperation and for-
eign experts, internships abroad, administrative
reorganisation, financial incentives - have had only
mixed success in weak states. As the Report notes,
external assistance and recurring obligations for
Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew is a classic example.
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meeting performance criteria of programmes have
absorbed technical competence, which is already in
short supply and disturbed strategic policymaking
capabilities. Instruments are lacking that could bet-
ter identify and promote those who play the game,
as it were, despite inherent limits with technocrats.
In weak states, one solution resorted to by donors
has been to multiply agencies of restraint and tech-
nical agencies located inside or parallel to the state
administration. These have, however, often resulted
less in competition than in disorganisation, to the
detriment of their efficiency ownership, and learn-
ing effects for other functionaries.
Corruption. Corruption is fittingly one of the main
themes of the Report. Its real mechanisms, which
are not analogous to those of the developed coun-
tries, are dealt with quickly however, giving rise to
incomplete analyses on the structure of incentives
(in this case, levels of salary) and thus on appropri-
ate measures to be taken. Contrary to what the
Report suggests, corruption cannot be entirely
reduced to the existence of individual opportunities
and the absence of sanctions. If it is true that inter-
national financial institutions were able to go too far
during the first generation of reforms in retaining
only the macro-economic aggregates of the overall
civil service wage bill, public agents in certain coun-
tries may be the most highly paid individuals in the
workforce, and with low salaries not being the only
instigation for corruption (Stasavage and Daubree
1997). Customs agents are one example here. The
Bank itself has shown that, in certain African coun-
tries, civil service salaries are considerably higher
than the average income and than the equivalent
ratio in developed countries. The elaborate organi-
sation of corruption, its eventual centralisation at
high political and institutional levels - including in
Africa, where it is superficially seen as being decen-
tralised - its political dimension (purchase of sup-
port), and its setting of markups are present in
many countries and complicate the taking of con-
crete measures to fight against it (as with the decen-
tralised corruption in 'collapsed states'). As the
Report emphasises, the link between corruption -
the 'symptom of problems' - and the public and
private environment involves an analysis of the
plurality of causes, in particular of temporal
horizons, the instability of the political and
economic environment, and the absence of social
protection that characterises many developing
countries (Sindzirigre 1997). The appropriate mea-
sures to be taken are likely to be different.
Civil society. The Report rightly recommends pop-
ular participation as an essential element of institu-
tional efficiency Forced passivity - and, for
example, the quasi-official racketeering of the poor
by functionaries - is a scandalous feature of many
developing countries and with serious conse-
quences for the costs of production and real
income. If the Bank should be congratulated for
stressïng bottom-up approaches and the reduction
of poverty, which is not always the priority of other
bilateral donors, one should not have illusions over
guarantees offered by this participation or these
'communities'. The associations in question do not
necessarily incarnate the autonomous power of civil
society, which they may claim to represent; they
may be financed by the state, and so on. In contra-
diction with the objectives of democratisation, these
associations may not be created as the result of a
representative process. And in contradiction with
the goal of strengthening the necessary functions of
the state, they may contribute to weakening the lat-
ter by their multiplicity, fragmentation, and/or role
as fronts for interest groups (thus the proliferation
of parties in the states of sub-Saharan Africa follow-
ing the end of single-party systems). Though aware
of these difficulties, the Bank is not properly
equipped in these types of states for making perti-
nent distinctions between local actors. This is a
problem of moral hazard and adverse selection
which affects the Bank as soon as it departs from its
traditional financial activities in well-defined eco-
nomic sectors, and from its role as a privileged cred-
itor. As with regulations and oversight agencies
mentioned above, the mechanisms and quality of
monitoring in the area of participation are not easy
to set in motion, neither for states, for the Bank, nor
other donors. Moreover, and as with action related
to the reinvigorating of the administration, the mul-
tiplicity of assistance agencies involved in civil soci-
ety may, in itself, lead to distortions when, as is
often the case, coherence and coordination are defi-
cient. This excess of agencies, which is associated
with the weakness of states, constitutes a more
general risk for aid programmes.
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3 The Constraints of International
Governance
The international dimension
This is one of the Report's themes that could have
been refined. Governments in fact possess complete
information on the hierarchy of their own internal
political priorities, are able to bargain geopolitically
over the reforms, and with knowledge of the inter-
nal constraints of donors, e.g., those regarding the
repayment of borrowed funds (Mosley et al. 1991;
Mosley 1992; Martin 1991). As an international
financial institution, the Bank is confronted with
the limits of its current mandate: it cannot build
local institutions - processes that are by definition
endogenous to states and societies - for fear of
undermining its credibility its status as an interna-
tional collective good, and its ability to tie the hands
of specific states.
In effect, developing states may not need aid agen-
cies if they are already viewed as credible on inter-
national markets and thus able to attract domestic
or foreign private investment, as in East Asía; or
they may be excessively dependent and lacking in
credibility, as in sub-Saharan Africa (aid represent-
ing more than 12 per cent of GDP in 1994). In these
two cases, whether it is a matter of the globalisation
of markets that question the utility and viability of
the Bretton Woods institutions, or the dependence
on the public savings of developed countries, a
reflection on the role and mandate of the Bank for
these states cannot be avoided. This has become
imperative given the increasingly vocal sectors of
opinion within developed countries, most notably
the USA, that are calling into question the Bretton
Woods institutions by invoking the pre-eminence of
the market. Though the stakes are high the Report
nonetheless avoids this issue (despite an abundant
literature, e.g., the internal reflection of the Bretton
Woods Commission 1994; Richardson and Haralz
1995; Kapur et al. 1997). In the context of depen-
dency, in particular, which is made up precisely of
'problem' states, the Bank cannot avoid the fact that
it has become one of the principal internal actors. If
it is true that the credibility of states is one element
in their level of efficiency, then the credibility of the
Bank is also one of its dimensions. It needs to reflect
on this dilemma.
The problems of internal and multilateral
credibility are played out on several complex levels.
Signals for reform coming from the outside may be
interpreted in different ways: as irrelevant; as coer-
cive and touching at the heart of the state (aid as a
reward-sanction), and incurring the risk of dimin-
ishing the credibility of the government vis-à-vis its
own citizens and private investors (Sindzingre
1996); as a substitute for local capabilities when
there is no other choice;6 or as a purchase of reforms
by the donor, which can be reversed and put up for
sale several times by the country as soon as it is
able7 (e.g., the repeated assessment of the public
wage bill, the census of civil service staff levels
which are immediately increased in size after ini-
tially being reduced). After decades of indifference
on the part of the Bretton Woods agencies toward
the character of the regimes in borrowing countries,
the new themes and recommendations in the
Report - including the fight against corruption and
for democratisation, whose relationship with devel-
opment has, in fact, not been demonstrated
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997) - may be per-
ceived by recipient states as not entirely credible.
They may be interpreted as the current fashion, or
the expression of the decline of the importance of
these states following the end of the Cold War and
the slashii'ig of funds allocated to foreign aid in the
budgets of developed countries. It is the well-
known problem of the failure of conditionality
(Killick 1996; Collier 1997): the limited credibility
of multilateral agencies who have, after 15 years of
programmes, not brought about any increase in the
flow of private capital. Sometimes their pro-
grammes may even result in inverse signals - that
the economies are in distress - or of a weak owner-
ship of reforms originating from the outside. These
are absorbed and 'digested', unless the signals are
quite strong, disabuse expectations that the aid will
always flow, and that precedence will always be
accorded to local political priorities. External agen-
cies, coming from the outside, cannot substitute for
endogenous processes, nor give credibility to local
governments and institutions that lack them, other
than in the form of restraint. As soon as this
restraint comes from the outside, however, it is fil-
tered through local segmentations: reforms pushed
by the Bretton Woods agencies, such as the fight
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against rent-seeking by the holders of power or
against corruption, are greatly appreciated by the
opposition, for example, from which ensues obvi-
ous problems vis-à-vis governments and the apolit-
ical mandate of the Bank. This restraint is a
necessary process but is not sufficient for improving
the quality of a government's relationship with its
citizens. External aid in the building of good gov-
ernment leads to dilemmas that are insufficiently
analysed in the Report.
WDR97 could be clearer about its own status and
potential capacity In the first place, it could better
present the hierarchical relationships and relations
of causality between the different sectors analysed:
the virtues of refusing a simple universal model and
the abundance of facts render the understanding of
it difficult (e.g. the existence of infrastructures,
mentioned in passing in the Report, may be
regarded as an essential determinant in the effi-
ciency of institutions). Next, policy guidelines
could have been better specified, even if this is not
an easy task. Finally, it went only halfway, using aca-
demic research, whereas its author, the Bank, has
powers and specific instruments (and limits) at its
disposal. In summary, the Report is silent on the
Bank itself. Moreover, it expresses both optimism
and a realistic pessimism: with lucidity and finesse
it indicates the elements of institutional change, but
it continually emphasises that innovations will not
be efficient without the prior existence of matching
institutional capabilities. These are correct warnings
but cannot escape tautology: states with better
capabilities and commitment are in a better position
to put in place efficient institutions and institution-
intensive approaches. The reader is left wondering
what concretely should be done with other states.
For the latter, the Report endorses a 'lighter agenda
for state action'. This is, however, what is really at
stake: strong states are precisely less dependent on
the Bank and its analyses. For weak states, the
Report could have gone deeper into the possible
signals of internal and external change, i.e., of aid
programmes taking into account the current poor
results: the possibility of inciting and sanctioning
governments, given the mandate and instruments at
See the Policy Eramework Papers drafted in Among the numerous countries here are the Côte
Washington, and other programmes. d'Ivoire, which enjoys both multilateral and bilateral
agreements, and Kenya, until a recent signal from the
IMP in 1997.
the Bank's disposal. These points are avoided in the
Report.8
The coherence of external agencies of
restraint
lt is important that external agencies have a better
understanding of the limitations of states which are
subject to personal rule. These states are themselves
hostage to the weakness of their civil societies, to
individual and/or corporatist calculations, and to
the absence of the notion of the general interest,
even if the leaders are personally committed to the
reforms. External agencies must also be attentive to
the disjuncture between the economic and political
realms, to the difficulties that arise from sequenc-
ing, and to the rhythms and simultaneity of the two
types of liberalisation - political and economic -
specific to each state. One feature that may be noted
in the Report is an evolution in the analysis in
favour of gradualism. The economic and political
credibility of powerholders is not identical, either
for themselves or for private agents. Certain reforms
may disturb different stages of the political liberali-
sation process or the electoral cycle. Many weak
governments are characterised by short-term
domestic exigencies - both political and economic
- that are related to important asymmetries of infor-
mation on their part. Creditor agencies often find
themselves in contradiction with their objectives
here, as well as with the objective of more local
ownership of reforms: the urgency of financial
deadlines and conditionality are often perceived as
coercive, which is incompatible with the intemali-
sation of reforms. As the Bretton Woods institutions,
in fact, know full well and pragmatically demonstrate
in the choice of countries they present as models,9
resolving the problem of illegitimate governments
does not involve formal democratisation as the first
step, but rather long-term institutional consolidation.
An important task is to encourage weak governments
based on personal rule to focus on building durable
political institutions and on assuring the insertion of
their countries in the world economy - and for them
to see this as being in their interest - rather than fix-
ating on domestic political considerations related to
problems of legitimacy
The very fact, however, that territories can demand
their recolonization (the Comoro island of Anjouan in
1997) - a surprising recognition of internal
powerlessness - demonstrates, if need be, the stakes
involved in the action of external entities.
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4 Conclusion: a Renewed
Reflection on Multilateralism
To be exploited in full, the insightful analyses of the
Report must form the basis of a larger reflection on
the role and room for manoeuvre of developing
states in a globalised world, on the sectors that the
latter impacts upon, and also on the leeway of mul-
tilateral organisations (as the 1997 economic crisis
in East Asia shows). These analyses suggest an
improvement of international coherence in a glob-
aliszed world, which is, in principle, the focus of
the Report. Globalisation is a risky process, gener-
ating reactive policies and political regression; states
may remain on the sidelines or resort to 'exit
options'. The current multilateral system, which is a
public good but nonetheless subject to the influ-
ence of member countries, is an important dimen-
sion, and that could have been better dealt with in
the Report; for the credibility and the operational
prospects of the Report's recommendations are at
stake. Conditionality has shown its limits. The new
idea of selectivity - the Bank, in view of its scarce
financial resources, has decided to lend only to
countries that are 'good performers' - is a positive
signal. Its uses and effects depend, however, - given
the ambivalent effects of embargoes - on domestic
institutions, regional balances of powers, and
modes of insertion in the international system.
The analyses of the Report thus suggest a reflection
on multilateralism and on the rules of multilateral
institutions, since these constitute a global public
good for internationalised markets and weak states
lacking credibility: e.g., the reduction of uncer-
tainty, production of information, global agencies of
restraint for these markets and states, correction of
negative externalities. The Report emphasises -
though too briefly - the necessity of rethinking the
effectiveness of aid; this issue could have been one
of its main focuses. Bilateral aid has not helped
states to implement good policies. This should not
be surprising, given the role of aid in the foreign
policy of donor states; but multilateral assistance
has done no better (Burnside and Dollar 1997). The
Report also underscores the importance of clear
objectives and limits, in order that an institution
Ghana at one time, now Uganda, not to mention states
whose democratic institutions leave much to be desired,
such as China, which creates credibility problems for
conditionalities that are applied to other countries.
(such as a central bank) may operate efficiently The
assistance of external agencies, in order to consti-
tute art efficient and credible 'restraint', must follow
the same principles and seek to minimise the risks
of confusion induced by the differences in political
culture, interests, and objectives of each actor.
This reflection on multilateralism has two dimen-
sions. The first is to refine the reflection on the two
types of credibility involved here: not only those of
states, but also of multilaterals. The latter are caught
between the exteriority of the multilateral mandate,
which is a guarantee of their credibility, and the par-
tial substitution for institutions in weak states,
which leads to resistance and risks regarding the
transparency and credibility of the mandate in
question. The second dimension is to clarify the
reflection on the actual multilateral character of
these institutïons: on the internal institutional level
- for example, the internal rationality and perfor-
mance criteria'0 at the Bank does not necessarily fol-
low the same logic as the goals and mandate held
up for outsiders, nor is it based on a deep knowl-
edge of the countries in question; vis-à-vis other
bilateral donors, who are member states of the Bank
but have their own interests and influence in the
international arena; and vis-à-vis developing coun-
tries, who are also member states. For the latter, an
improved and more effective participation on their
part in the international system, leading to more
local ownership, is an important element for reflec-
tion on a theme such as the 'state in a
changing world'.
Project cycles, promotions, remuneration.
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